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Rethinking Sustained Competitive Advantage from Human Capital

ABSTRACT
The strategy literature often emphasizes firm-specific human capital as a source of competitive
advantage based on the assumption that it constrains employee mobility. This paper first identifies
three boundary conditions that limit the applicability of this logic. It then offers a more
comprehensive framework of human capital-based advantage that explores both demand- and
supply-side mobility constraints. The critical insight is that these mobility constraints have more
explanatory power than the firm-specificity of human capital.
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RETHINKING SUSTAINED COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE FROM
HUMAN CAPITAL
Extant strategy theory suggests that human capital can be a source of sustainable competitive
advantage (Coff, 1997; Hall, 1993), but only if isolating mechanisms prevent workers from taking
their valuable knowledge and skills to rival firms (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984). One of the most
important isolating mechanisms is firm-specific human capital, or knowledge and skills embodied
in individuals that cannot be easily applied in other firms (Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003;
Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Kor & Leblebici, 2005). Building on Becker’s (1964) seminal work, the
prototypical logic in the strategy literature argues that firm-specific human capital limits
individuals’ mobility while general human capital does not. Thus, firm-specific human capital is
assumed to support sustained competitive advantage. Likewise, general human capital is assumed
not to support sustained advantages since mobility threats allow workers to appropriate the rents
associated with their skills and thereby erode any advantages.
This paper extends theories of human capital-based competitive advantage in two ways. We
begin by clarifying three key unstated boundary conditions that limit the usefulness of extant
theories connecting human capital and competitive advantage. The following three conditions
must be in place for traditional logics to hold: (1) the exchange value (i.e., market value) of
workers’ general human capital can be no greater than the use value (i.e., the value created in its
current application) of workers’ full portfolios of human capital in the focal firm, (2) the exchange
value of worker skills and the firm-specificity of those skills must be tightly coupled, and (3)
supply-side mobility constraints (i.e., factors that cause workers to choose to stay apart from
demand for their skills) cannot be so low that workers are willing to incur substantial financial
costs to move.
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Put simply, extant theory suggests homogeneous complementary resources across firms and a
strong form of labor market efficiency. Thus, our discussion of boundary conditions highlights the
need for a more robust framework connecting human capital and competitive advantage.
Accordingly, after articulating the boundary conditions, the paper contributes by developing a
more comprehensive framework predicting when human capital may lead to sustained advantages.
We focus on the interaction of both demand- and supply-side constraints on worker mobility,
where demand-side constraints affect labor market demand for workers and supply-side constraints
influence workers’ willingness to supply their labor externally. This differs from the extant strategy
literature that has focused primarily on demand-side factors. The framework captures the rich
variation in outcomes for real firms and, contrary to the received strategy literature, suggests that,
under certain conditions, even general human capital can support a sustained competitive
advantage. Thus, we contribute to the growing focus on micro-foundations of competitive
advantage by unpacking firm specificity from other reasons why human capital may facilitate
sustained performance differences (Felin & Hesterly, 2007; Foss, 2011).
HOW FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL FUNCTIONS AS AN ISOLATING
MECHANISM
A firm has a competitive advantage “if it is able to create more economic value than the
marginal (breakeven) competitor” (Peteraf & Barney, 2003: 314), and firms are positioned to
sustain such advantages when isolating mechanisms hinder rivals from acquiring key resources
(Rumelt, 1984). Thus, ex-post mobility limits on resources such as non-tradability, switching costs,
co-specialization of assets, and high transaction costs play a critical role (Peteraf, 1993). Firmspecificity is one potential isolating mechanism since firm-specific resources cannot be redeployed
in other organizations “without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1988: 70). Hence,
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firm-specific resources have been closely tied to the theory of competitive advantage as a driver
of distinctive capabilities (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Conner, 1991).1 For example, firms may
develop idiosyncratic routines that help them address firm-specific challenges, such as the systems
underlying Walmart’s hub-and-spoke distribution system to efficiently stock its rural stores. These
routines were co-specialized to its rural locations, and Kmart could not easily imitate them without
a costly investment in a rural store network.
Firm-specific human capital refers to worker-level knowledge, skills, and abilities (hereafter
skills) that have limited applicability outside of the focal firm (Becker, 1964). In contrast, general
human capital refers to worker skills that are broadly applicable outside of the focal firm.2
Examples of firm-specific human capital include knowledge of a firm’s proprietary technology or
social landscape. Workers may be able to take such knowledge with them when they leave, but it
is imperfectly deployable in the new firm (He & Wang, 2009; Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009).
Returning to the example above, Walmart employees who understand the unique distribution
systems cannot easily apply this knowledge if they change jobs to rivals since their knowledge is
co-specialized to a broad mix of assets unique to Walmart. In contrast, the most common examples
of general human capital are the skills gained through education, where basic reading, writing, and
math skills are easily deployable in many firms.
Many strategy scholars have suggested that resources and capabilities may take the form of
knowledge and skills that are embedded in people (e.g., Coff, 1997; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Kor &
Leblebici, 2005). As such, human capital can be at the core of a resource-based advantage if it is

1

This underscores the role of non-substitutability in assuring that rivals lack strategically equivalent resources
(Barney, 1991).
2
In the strategy context, industry-specific (Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000), occupation-specific (Kambourov & Manovskii,
2009), and task-specific (Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010) human capital can be treated as special cases of general
human capital. These other types of human capital are applicable in other contexts and thus their role in supporting
sustained competitive advantage is analogous to that of general human capital.
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valuable, rare, and can be kept from rivals.3 However, human capital is not owned, or even fully
controlled, by the firm. Employees are free to quit at will and take their human capital to alternative
employers. As a consequence, human capital can be isolated only to the extent that employees
have little ability (or willingness) to leave the firm – i.e., when there are strong ex-post limits to
worker mobility (Peteraf, 1993).
The importance of limiting employee mobility in supporting competitive advantage has led
strategy scholars to emphasize firm-specific human capital (Helfat, 1994; Kor & Leblebici, 2005;
Wang et al., 2009).4 This emphasis is due to the deeply held assumption in the classic human
capital literature that firm-specific human capital constrains worker mobility (e.g., Bartel & Borjas,
1977; Glick & Feuer, 1984; Hashimoto, 1981; Jovanovic, 1979; Parsons, 1972). The logic
underlying this assumption is as follows. Firm-specific skills have limited applicability to other
firms, resulting in a large difference between the use value of workers’ firm-specific skills in the
focal firm and the use value of these skills in alternative employers. The low use value affects the
wages that alternative firms are willing to pay for these skills in the labor market; thus, these skills
have low exchange value. Similarly, because general human capital is broadly applicable, it has
high use value to multiple firms, and thus it has high exchange value.
The assumed low exchange value of firm-specific human capital in the labor market creates a
dilemma for workers. According to Becker’s (1964) investment framework, workers can choose
to invest in either firm-specific or general skills – these are mutually exclusive activities. Thus,
firm-specific skills represent foregone investments in general skills. By investing in firm-specific

3

We focus, throughout this article, on human capital that is both rare and valuable such that it can be a source of above
normal value creation. Human capital that is neither rare nor valuable is not examined here.
4
While strategy scholars typically assume that general human capital cannot be a source of competitive advantage,
strategic human resource management scholars have acknowledged that general skills may, in fact, lead to firm-level
performance. An important aspect of firm heterogeneity in their abilities to attract and retain such workers is their
human resource practices and systems that may hold workers in place regardless of specificity (e.g. Lepak & Snell,
1999; Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994). We discuss this point more explicitly later.
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skills, workers increase their use value to their employers, without accompanying increases in their
exchange value in the labor market. If the focal firm pays workers a portion of their increased use
value from firm-specific human capital (Becker, 1964; Williamson, 1975), then workers face a
dilemma when considering a move. External employers can offer compensation that reflects the
exchange value of workers’ human capital, but the focal firm can offer compensation up to the use
value of their human capital (both firm-specific and general). If general human capital has a
constant value across firms (as is often assumed) but firm-specific human capital has a higher
value at the current employer, a move requires sacrificing both the compensation for firm-specific
skills and the opportunity costs (e.g., of investments in general human capital they could have
made). The logical conclusion is that firms can retain workers with firm-specific human capital
for less than the full use value. This has led to the deeply held assumption that firm-specific human
capital hinders worker mobility (Hashimoto, 1981; Jovanovic, 1979; Parsons, 1972). However,
such skills do not necessarily prevent mobility – it is assumed that workers may move if they are
willing to accept reduced wages.
From a strategic perspective, firm-specific human capital potentially functions as an isolating
mechanism in two ways. First, workers with firm-specific human capital are less likely to leave
voluntarily and, therefore, they are less likely to take valuable general knowledge and capabilities
to rival firms. Second, even when these workers do leave voluntarily, the firm-specific human
capital they take with them cannot be perfectly deployed and utilized in rival firms. In other words,
relying on firm-specific human capital enhances a firm’s ability to sustain advantages both because
workers are less likely to leave and because even if they do leave they cannot easily apply their
firm-specific knowledge elsewhere.
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Interestingly, despite the fact that competitive advantage research focuses heavily on firmspecific human capital, an emerging body of strategy research focuses explicitly on general and
industry-specific human capital. This is a clear acknowledgement that such human capital can be
valuable and rare and is thus important in its own right, but this literature does not theoretically
link general human capital to sustained competitive advantage. For example, Somaya, Williamson,
and Lorinkova (2008) describe how law firms may gain revenue when attorneys move to the client
side. Zenger (1992) studies how small firms may be able to attract and retain certain types of
human capital through their ability to customize incentive contracts. These studies highlight novel
sources of value creation from general human capital, but do not clarify how much revenue is
captured by the employees. If employees capture the value from their general human capital, most
strategy scholars would assume that there is no competitive advantage – i.e., an advantage may
exist if the firm retains valuable human capital for less than the use value. While the value creation
abilities of both firm-specific and general human capital are well established, it is less clear when
firm-specific human capital may fail to support competitive advantage or when general human
capital can generate sustained advantage.
ESTABLISHING BOUNDARY CONDITIONS FOR THE FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN
CAPITAL STORY
The logic underlying the strategy literature’s traditional conceptualization of firm-specificity
as an isolating mechanism is appropriate in some contexts, but there are many real-world contexts
where this logic fails. This section develops in detail three important and largely ignored boundary
conditions that constrain the applicability of the firm-specific human capital story when seeking
to explain sustained competitive advantages.
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Heterogeneous Value of the Portfolio of Worker Skills
The logic underlying mobility constraints due to firm-specific human capital relies on a key
assumption in the labor economics literature that conflicts with one of the core assumptions of the
resource-based theory of the firm. While labor economists typically treat firms as homogeneous
in order to explore labor markets more broadly, resource-based theorists explicitly assume
heterogeneity in firm resources. Thus, the very definition of general human capital must be reexamined in light of a world where firms have unique portfolios of resources and capabilities.
Specifically, even though such skills are widely applicable in other firms, their use value may
differ considerably between firms due to different technologies, product markets, and
complementary assets (Teece, 1986). Accordingly, if a rival firm has more productive
complementary assets, a worker’s general skills may be more highly valued externally than at the
current employer. This may overshadow any firm-specific skills that are not valued externally,
thereby facilitating mobility despite the presence of firm-specific skills.
This distinction supports treating workers as having a portfolio of skills where if one element
of the portfolio restricts mobility, another may enhance mobility. Accordingly, it is critical to
analyze the nature of entire portfolios of skills rather than any single skill in isolation. A single
skill that has low applicability outside of the current context may have low exchange value and,
therefore, rival firms will not rationally compensate workers for that skill. In practice, however,
workers have portfolios of both general and firm-specific skills (Lazear, 2009). Shifting focus to
the individual’s portfolio of skills highlights the need to consider labor market demand for all the
worker’s skills simultaneously rather than any isolated skills individually.
The risk of losing workers to firms with more productive complementary assets increases as
the relative importance of firm-specific human capital decreases. So, in contexts where Lazear’s
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(2009) claim that general human capital creates more value than firm-specific human capital is
valid, the incremental wage attributable to firm-specific skills is quite small, and consequently the
productivity difference required for rivals to poach employees with firm-specific skills is also
small. In this context, the firm-specific human capital may not limit employee mobility.
Consider, for example, a software developer with expertise in optimizing video streaming
technologies who works at a small firm developing software for insurance companies. Her skills
are used mostly to create and stream tutorials to clients, and she has acquired substantial firmspecific human capital. For example, she can organize teams, is well connected within the
company, can navigate the internal bureaucracy to get things accomplished, and understands the
complexities of the firm’s proprietary modules. However, suppose Google wants access to her
streaming video optimization skills. Because streaming video optimization creates far more value
at Google than it does at her current employer, Google may be willing to compensate her more for
her general skills than her current employer is willing to compensate her for both her general and
firm-specific skills; thus, her firm-specific skills may not bind her to her current employer.
This example demonstrates that focusing on individual skills in isolation provides an
insufficient and perhaps misleading understanding of how human capital influences mobility.
Focusing instead on portfolios of skills highlights the important observation that firm-specific
skills may not restrict mobility if an employee’s general skills are more valuable to other firms.
This idea yields the following boundary condition on extant human capital logics:
Boundary condition 1: A necessary condition for firm-specific human capital to function
as an isolating mechanism is that the exchange value of workers’ general human
capital is no greater than the use value of workers’ full portfolio of human capital in
the focal firm (holding constant supply-side constraints on worker mobility).

10

Imperfect Information and Exchange Value
In addition to focusing on portfolios of worker skills rather than isolated skills, the
informational problems in real labor markets suggest the need to revisit a core underlying
assumption embedded in traditional human capital logic: the tight coupling between demand-side
mobility constraints and skill specificity. In the traditional logic, if skills are imperfectly
transferrable or inapplicable at rivals, then alternative employers derive low use value from that
skill. It follows that these skills have low exchange value. This coupling between specificity and
exchange value requires sufficient information in the labor market for alternative employers to
observe and properly value skills in an alternative context.
Real labor markets are fraught with information problems, however, making it very difficult
for hiring firms to evaluate the human capital any individual worker possesses (Chiang & Chiang,
1990; Jovanovic, 1979). Given the challenges associated with assessing the value of a worker,
especially one outside the boundaries of the firm, it is likely that firms will incorrectly value the
skill portfolio of potential employees. However, firms can reduce their exposure to the risks
associated with erroneous assessments by relying on signals such as personal recommendations
(Granovetter, 1973) or previous employment relationships (Spence, 1973), or by offering low
upfront compensation with the promise of greater rewards if the worker is revealed to be of high
quality (Bidwell & Briscoe, 2010; Gilson & Mnookin, 1995). Although these mechanisms
minimize exposure to risks, they do not solve the underlying issue that firms have limited ability
to forecast the value of a skill portfolio when brought inside the organization.
If worker skill portfolios are incorrectly valued in the labor market, then it is possible that
workers with portfolios of mostly general human capital may face low demand, while workers
with portfolios of mostly firm-specific human capital may experience high external demand. In
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other words, rather than a tight coupling between the exchange value of a skill portfolio and the
firm-specificity of the skills in that portfolio, the relationship may best be represented as a 2 X 2
table (demand-side mobility constraints X firm-specificity of the skill portfolio). This is shown in
Figure 1 and is discussed in detail below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[Insert Figure 1 about here]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The upper left and lower right quadrants of Figure 1 correspond to the traditional firm-specific
and general human capital logics, respectively. These cells represent the mechanisms likely to be
in play when there is tight coupling between demand-side mobility constraints and firm-specificity
of worker skills. The upper right and lower left quadrants, however, represent scenarios not
typically considered in the traditional human capital story. These quadrants capture scenarios
when the market incorrectly values workers’ skill portfolios. In the upper right quadrant the market
undervalues a portfolio of highly transferrable skills. As a consequence, workers in this quadrant
are relatively immobile, even though their skills are highly transferrable. Likewise, in the bottom
left quadrant the market overvalues a portfolio of highly firm-specific skills. As a consequence,
workers in this quadrant are highly mobile, even though their skills are imperfectly transferrable.
Since these two quadrants illustrate departures from the traditional human capital logics, the
following sections discuss these cells in more detail.
Undervalued general human capital. Firms may undervalue general human capital in real
labor markets for at least two reasons. First, a general characteristic of labor markets is that there
is incomplete information about the quality and quantity of workers’ knowledge and skills (Berg,
1970; Jovanovic, 1979; Spence, 1973). This information problem is, in essence, the classic lemons
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problem (Akerlof, 1970). Firms cannot evaluate whether the prospective employee is a high or
low quality worker, which causes them to offer wages as if they were hiring lemons. The lemons
problem leads to high-quality workers being undervalued in the labor market because their true
quality is imperfectly observable to outsiders.
Second, firms may be able to observe workers’ skills, but may be unwilling to pay the full use
value of those skills due to some other stigma attached to the worker. For example, even if
lawyers’ general skills appear to be quite valuable, law firms may be less willing to hire lawyers
who worked at stigmatized law firms (Rider, Negro, & Roberts, 2011). A similar process of
systematically incorrect employer assumptions about productivity may allow discrimination to
persist in labor markets (Starbuck, 1993). In these situations workers have general skills that are
relatively easy to apply elsewhere, and may have high use value elsewhere, but the labor market
prices these skills too low due to incorrect collective perceptions.
Overvalued firm-specific human capital. Just as firms may undervalue a worker’s bundle of
general human capital, they may overvalue a worker’s bundle of firm-specific human capital.
Firm-specific human capital can provide a strong signal for valuable underlying general skills for
at least two reasons. First, valuable general human capital may be necessary before workers can
successfully acquire firm-specific human capital (Ployhart, Weekley, & Ramsey, 2009; Ployhart,
Van Iddekinge, & MacKenzie, 2011). Second, valuable general human capital may be codeveloped as workers make highly firm-specific investments (Morris, Alvarez, Barney, & Molloy,
2010). Accordingly, an employer seeking a worker who is willing and able to make substantial
firm-specific investments may target people who have made such investments elsewhere, even if
the prior investments are not transferable because workers’ past firm-specific investments signal
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the willingness and ability to make future investments. In this case, workers’ investments in firmspecific skills may actually increase their market value.
However, firm-specific human capital may not always accurately signal valuable underlying
general human capital. Consider, for example, a business school dean who demonstrates great
fundraising success at her current institution. Rivals may observe the success and attribute it to
some underlying general ability of the dean to raise funds when, in fact, the success may rely on
highly idiosyncratic knowledge about the alumni of that particular school. A rival might hire this
dean away, only to discover that she is unable to recreate the necessary alumni-specific knowledge
in the new setting. In this case, the knowledge is not transferrable and the complementary asset is
not easily recreated in the new setting.5
In the dean example, incomplete information regarding the value of worker skills in alternative
organizations drives a wedge between workers’ exchange value and the true use value of their
skills. While the implications of decoupling exchange value from firm-specificity will be discussed
in greater detail later, it is important to note that human capital that is systematically undervalued
in the labor market may be a source of sustained competitive advantage because the focal firm can
potentially retain workers with undervalued human capital for less than the use value of their skills.
Likewise, overvalued firm-specific human capital may actually degrade a firm’s competitiveness
for two reasons: (1) the focal firm may have to share more rents with workers to persuade them to
stay, and (2) workers with firm-specific human capital will have greater outside options making it
more likely that they will leave and take their valuable knowledge and skills with them. Thus, the

5

It is often assumed that firm-specific human capital is harder to observe than general human capital. If true,
mispricing might occur more frequently for firm-specific human capital. As our analysis suggests, this may not mean
that firm-specific human capital is systematically valued lower. In fact, consistent with Groysberg et. al’s (2008)
findings, rivals may assume firm-specific human capital is worth more than is ultimately the case.
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logic underlying firm-specific human capital as an isolating mechanism requires a second
boundary condition. Formally:

Boundary condition 2: A necessary condition for firm-specific human capital to function
as an isolating mechanism is that the exchange value of worker skills and the firmspecificity of those skills must be tightly coupled (holding constant supply-side
constraints on worker mobility).
Supply-Side Mobility Constraints
The prior sections articulate important boundary conditions for extant human capital theory
independent of supply-side constraints on worker mobility because traditional human capital
theory relies solely on demand-side logics for constrained mobility. The explanation is that
workers stay in their current firms because there is low external demand for their firm-specific
skills, and workers change firms because of high external demand for their skills, independent of
their desires to leave the current firm – i.e., workers are not averse to changing firms and always
choose the employer that offers the highest wage. These simplifying assumptions have led many
human capital scholars to ignore supply-side mobility constraints.
A variety of labor market imperfections in real labor markets may constrain employee mobility
independent of the specificity of their human capital. While a full list of all labor market
imperfections that can support competitive advantage is beyond the scope of this paper, two
important imperfections are presented: mobility costs and information asymmetries. Each of these
imperfections can constrain the mobility of employees with valuable human capital and thus
facilitate creating and sustaining human capital-based competitive advantage.
Mobility costs. Search, bargaining, and switching costs hinder employee mobility because it is
often costly for workers to search for alternative jobs, negotiate with their current employers or
switch to new jobs. In many cases, workers will prefer to avoid these costs, which can effectively
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immobilize key employees (Wright et al., 1994). Even where workers’ knowledge and skills are
in high demand, mobility costs may make them behave as though they had no other viable
alternatives. Accordingly, as mobility costs decrease, mobility rates increase (Stevenson, 2009),
as does the speed of finding new jobs (Kuhn & Skuterud, 2004).
Some important examples of factors that influence the mobility costs borne by employees
include idiosyncratic employee preferences and legal restrictions. First, idiosyncratic worker
preferences for a given employer may increase mobility costs. For example, if firms can offer
unique inimitable compensation packages that cater to individuals’ idiosyncratic preferences, then
firms can potentially attract and retain highly productive employees with general human capital.
These packages may consist simultaneously of factors that firms actively create and offer to
employees (such as carefully designed medical benefits packages) as well as factors that function
more like economic externalities (such as proximity to family). While financial compensation and
market-based benefits are easily imitable, non-pecuniary rewards may be impossible or costly to
imitate. For example, firms may offer access to unique social networks or an environment where
specific values are nurtured (e.g., firm stability, ethical behavior, faith, etc.) that cannot be easily
recreated in another firm. The matching of unique incentives to idiosyncratic worker preferences
may make it unlikely that people will quit, even if they have broadly transferable human capital
and are offered a higher wage. Firms certainly differ in their ability to design incentive contracts,
so this could be an important source of variation in the ability to attract and retain individuals with
valuable human capital (Rousseau, 2005; Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006; Zenger, 1992).
If individuals have very strong geographic preferences, they may rationally choose to search
in locally thin markets. For example, hospitals and universities in small towns often act as local
monopsonies. If they are the only buyers of medical and academic talent in a region, then they can
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use their market power to retain highly productive employees at financial discounts relative to
rivals in regions with more competitive labor markets. Individuals with strong geographic
preferences will not switch jobs to join rivals in less desirable regions because their total utility
(which includes the utility derived from their compensation package and the utility derived from
their location) is greater than the total utility associated with a higher-paying position in a lessdesirable location. As a result, monopsonists in desirable locations can attract and retain employees
at a discount due to the non-pecuniary benefits associated with the location.
Legal institutions, such as non-compete agreements and patent enforcement, also create
frictions in otherwise freely operating labor markets. For example, Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming
(2009) demonstrate that non-compete agreements not only restrict the use of firm-specific human
capital, but in many cases the use of general human capital as well. In a similar vein, Agarwal,
Ganco, and Ziedonis (2009) show that employers’ reputations for aggressive patent enforcement
discourage mobility of inventors. Thus, the existence of legal institutions can provide significant
market imperfections. Legal restrictions may have an impact even when they are unenforceable
since employees must bear the legal and emotional costs of challenging such agreements and thus
are less likely to supply their effort to rival employers.
Information asymmetries. For the same reasons that firms have limited information on the use
value of a potential employee, it may be hard for employees to know their exchange value in the
labor market. If workers underestimate their exchange value, they may not search for outside
options needed to bargain for higher wages. This constitutes a supply-side mobility constraint
because workers choose not to explore supplying their labor on the external labor market.
While there is limited information on both sides of the labor market on the value of an
individual inside a firm, if employers know more about the use value of the full portfolio of worker
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skills than employees know about their own skills, they can leverage this knowledge to decrease
worker mobility, even those with general human capital. If firms create an environment where it
is very costly for workers to assess the use value of their own human capital and where workers
undervalue their contribution, then these workers may not know that they can bargain for higher
compensation. This logic is particularly relevant in a dynamic context. Even if workers can
accurately assess their use value and/or their exchange value in the labor market in one time period,
it may not be possible for employees to predict how their internal and external value will change
over time.
In summary, employees can have constrained mobility in the absence of any firm-specific
human capital due to supply-side factors. While there are many labor market imperfections that
constrain mobility and support sustained competitive advantage, the two presented here serve to
demonstrate that a reliance on firm-specificity as an isolating mechanism in the strategy literature
leads to theory that is incomplete: there are many alternative factors that reduce employee mobility
even in the absence of firm-specific human capital. Likewise, supply-side factors could enhance
mobility if they are particularly low – i.e., if a firm is of particularly low desirability, workers may
generally prefer to leave. If so, the low supply-side constraints could outweigh the demand-side
constraints imposed by firm-specific human capital.

In other words, very low supply-side

constraints may provide a “push” factor causing workers to actively pursue alternative
employment options even if they incur a financial loss. Thus, the logics underlying firm-specific
human capital as an isolating mechanism can only hold when supply-side constraints are not so
low as to function as push factors. Formally,
Boundary condition 3: A necessary condition for firm-specific human capital to function
as an isolating mechanism is that supply-side mobility constraints cannot be so low
that workers are willing to incur substantial financial costs to move – i.e., supply-side
factors are not pushing workers to leave.

18

FROM BOUNDARY CONDITIONS TO A MORE COMPREHENSIVE
FRAMEWORK
The three boundary conditions developed earlier demonstrate some important limitations on
the assertion that firm-specific human capital will act as an effective isolating mechanism. This
section builds on those boundary conditions to provide a more comprehensive framework for the
conditions under which human capital may be isolated and, therefore, facilitate sustained
advantages. By so doing, we advance theory of human capital-based competitive advantages
beyond a simple reliance on firm-specificity to accommodate demand- and supply-side mobility
constraints. Firms’ bundles of complementary human assets, such as team members and managers,
and complementary non-human assets, such as production technologies and employee culture,
affect both the demand-side factors and supply-side factors that affect individual workers. These
factors then combine with the heterogeneous preferences and skills of individuals to determine
employee mobility. In Figure 2 we present a 2 X 2 X 2 framework (demand-side constraints X
supply-side constraints X skill specificity) that highlights how firm variation in complementary
assets leads to different demand- and supply-side constraints and can thus facilitate the retention
of key employees.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In Figure 2, the column at the far right highlights scenarios that rely on general human capital
(low specificity) while the left column reflects scenarios involving firm-specific human capital.

6
While complementary assets that affect demand- and supply-side constraints can be costly, and firms vary in their
investments in such constraints, we temporarily hold these costs constant across firms. This simplifying assumption
allows inferences regarding which cells in Figure 2 may facilitate sustained human capital-based advantages.
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Extant logics suggest that competitive advantages are most likely to occur on the left-hand side
since firm-specific skills are believed to function as an isolating mechanism. On the other hand,
traditional logic would suggest that competitive advantages will not occur on the right-hand side
since skills are easily applicable in multiple contexts. By separating demand-side constraints from
firm-specificity and simultaneously considering supply-side constraints, Figure 2 offers a richer
description of the heterogeneity of real-world outcomes than extant theory.
An important insight from Figure 2 is that firm-specificity may be an important factor in
determining whether the firm is able to realize a sustainable competitive advantage from human
capital, but it is not the dominant factor. Figure 2 expands beyond firm-specificity to demonstrate
that firms can acquire human capital-based competitive advantages from key workers when the
firm’s complementary assets result in supply-side mobility constraints that dominate demand-side
mobility constraints. In other words, competitive advantages may accrue when key workers’
attachments to their employers dominates their ability to demand exchange value outside the firm.
As argued previously, firm-specificity may influence demand for a worker’s skills and thus support
demand-side constraints; however the mapping between the skill specificity and worker overall
exchange value is imperfect. As a consequence, an over-emphasis on firm-specificity does not
match the breadth and complexity of outcomes in real organizations.
Cells 1 and 8 in Figure 2 most resemble the traditional firm-specific and general human capital
logics, respectively. Cell 1 captures the scenario in which workers have portfolios of highly firmspecific skills that are not transferrable elsewhere, the market correctly evaluates the external value
of those skills, and there is a high level of supply-side factors that make the firm desirable to
workers. For example, consider a business school faculty member at a top university who invests
heavily in case writing expertise. The complementary assets of the business school allow the
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school to create more value from the faculty member’s case writing skills than other institutions.
If her investment in case writing corresponds to a smaller investment in research, the external
demand for that faculty member’s skills may decrease. However, if the professor enjoys case
writing and the status attached to the university, she may prefer to stay regardless of external
demand for her human capital. In other words, the underlying complementary assets of job design
and school status combined with the faculty member’s preference for these factors create a strong
supply-side constraint to her mobility. In this case, supply- and demand-side factors are aligned
and effectively limit mobility. Accordingly, Cell 1 actually presents a significantly stronger case
for sustained competitive advantage than is normally expressed in the strategy literature, where
the supply side factors are largely ignored.
In contrast, Cell 8 captures the scenario in which workers have portfolios of highly
transferrable skills, the market correctly values these skills, and there are no supply-side factors
that would cause workers to want to stay in their current firms. For example, superstar athletes
tend to have highly transferrable skills that are easily observable and do not rely heavily on the
skills of teammates and coaches; therefore, their value in alternative organizations is relatively
predictable. In the absence of strong idiosyncratic preferences for unique complementary assets
that would cause a superstar to want to stay with a team, such as preference for the city, enjoyment
of the playing style, appreciation for the brand, and so forth, such athletes are highly mobile. We
would not expect human capital to be isolated in this situation. Again, the supply- and demandside factors are aligned, but this time they both promote the mobility of human capital. As such,
the scenario in Cell 8 offers a considerably stronger case for why a sustained advantage would not
emerge than the cases typically presented in the strategy literature.
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While some real-world scenarios do align with the standard assumptions connecting firmspecificity and competitive advantage (and thus map roughly into Cells 1 or 8), many scenarios do
not fit into the extant framework and thus fall into the other cells of Figure 2. Since these cells
depart from traditional logics connecting human capital to competitive advantage, they are
discussed in detail below along with illustrative examples.
Cell 2: General Human Capital As a Source of Sustained Advantage
Workers with general human capital can be effectively isolated when the market incorrectly
values that human capital and when supply-side factors cause workers to want to stay in their
current firms. For example, Starbuck (1993) describes the early success of Wachtell through hiring
talented Jewish lawyers at a time when many other law firms were discriminating against Jews.
These lawyers were highly skilled and highly qualified with largely general skills, but the market
undervalued them because of an unrelated stigma. Since Wachtell was willing to hire these
lawyers, they won a great deal of support and appreciation from the Jewish community. As a
consequence, Wachtell became the employer of choice for talented Jewish lawyers, even after the
market stigma abated. The resource of the firm’s reputation among these lawyers combined with
low external demand for these lawyers led to a sustainable human capital advantage through
primarily general human capital.
The surprising result from this cell is that general human capital can be isolated and, as a
consequence, can possibly be a source of sustained competitive advantage. When general human
capital is undervalued in the labor market and when workers prefer to stay at their focal firms, then
the focal firm is well positioned to realize advantages from that human capital. Formally,
Proposition 1: Firms are most likely to realize sustained advantages from general human
capital when both demand-side and supply-side mobility constraints are high.
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Cell 7: Firm-Specific Human Capital Fails to Confer an Advantage
If the market overvalues a worker’s firm-specific human capital and the worker wants to leave
the focal firm, then the combination of low supply- and demand-side constraints will likely lead
to high mobility. Consider, for example, the previously mentioned business school dean who
exhibits unprecedented fundraising success due to her deep knowledge of the alumni base (a firmspecific skill), but who is also discouraged by university administrators and/or local weather
conditions. Other business schools may see her fundraising success and incorrectly attribute that
success to her general fundraising ability when it is more correctly attributed to the idiosyncratic
match between her alumni knowledge and that particular institution. As a consequence, other
schools may place a high market price on her highly firm-specific skills. If she also wants to leave
due to her individual preferences, then this dean is likely to move to another institution. Despite
her highly firm-specific human capital, her current employer may be unwilling to offer enough
compensation to keep her in place.
The surprising result from this cell is that when both demand- and supply-side constraints are
low, even workers with portfolios of highly firm-specific human cannot be isolated. Thus, firms
that rely heavily on firm-specific human capital for business performance may face significant
retention challenges when both demand-side and supply-side constraints are low; in the aggregate,
these firms will struggle to retain workers with valuable firm-specific human capital. In such
cases, the focal firm will be unable to realize any long-term value from this highly firm-specific
human capital. Formally,
Proposition 2: Firms are unlikely to realize advantages from firm-specific human capital
when both demand-side and supply-side constraints are low.
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Cells 3-6: Conflicting Supply- and Demand-Side Factors
Up to this point, we have addressed the situations in which supply- and demand-side factors
are aligned (both high or both low). However, the middle four cells in Figure 2 deal with situations
in which one factor is high and the other is low. For these cells it is unclear, ex ante, whether a
firm will be able to isolate human capital and thereby realize sustained advantages. The result will
ultimately depend on the relative strength of the supply-side and demand-side constraints.
For example, Cell 3 might reflect a scientist who has made lifelong investments in a firm’s
proprietary technology, but who would prefer to leave the firm for any number of reasons. She
must choose whether the loss in income due to leaving her firm-specific skills behind overcomes
her negative utility associated with staying. When the negative utility of staying is shared by many
employees within a firm, then there is a higher likelihood that some of those employees will be
willing to incur monetary losses to avoid this negative utility. The overall balance of decisions to
stay and decisions to go, however, relies on the relative intensity of the negative utility and the
relative intensity of monetary loss incurred by employees by moving. In contrast, Cell 4 might
capture Wachtell if their Jewish lawyers desired to exit the organization. If the lawyers wanted to
move, but the market undervalued their human capital, then they would have had to choose
between the negative utility of staying with Wachtell versus the loss in income from changing
firms.
Cell 5 is likely a vexing cell for managers because workers possess skills that are uniquely
valued in the focal firm, but, for some reason, the external market incorrectly places a high value
on them. In order to retain these workers, managers must find supply-side constraints to hold them
in place, when the demand-side constraints should be holding them in place. An example may be
the dean whose success is driven by her idiosyncratic knowledge about the alumni base but who
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nevertheless has many outside options due to fundraising success. The focal institution will need
to find supply-side mechanisms to continue to hold this dean in place, such as surrounding the
dean with enjoyable and respected colleagues or providing a spousal position that other institutions
cannot match. When many workers with firm-specific human capital face inflated outside options,
then the firm, in aggregate, must ensure that supply-side constraints overcome the inflated market
demand in their efforts to retain workers.
Finally, Cell 6 captures a fairly common situation in real labor markets when skills are highly
valued elsewhere but workers prefer to stay in the focal firm. For example, academics tend to have
highly visible and easily valued general skills (e.g., publication ability). However, if they become
deeply entrenched in their communities because their families have developed dense networks of
friends (Lee, Sablynski, Mitchell, Burton, & Holtom, 2004; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, &
Erez, 2001), because they have built their dream homes, or because their offices are so messy that
it is not feasible to pack up their belongings, they may be highly immobile despite very general
skill sets. Alternative institutions would need to offer utility greater than the exchange value of
the academics’ general human capital and the returns from these other investments. If alternative
employers appropriately value the skills of the academic, they will be unwilling to offer greater
compensation than that.

In this case, the academics have effectively made firm-specific

investments that keep them in place, yet they do not possess firm-specific human capital.
Ultimately, the competitive implications associated with employing workers in these middle
cells are unclear without the ability to determine when the supply-side or demand-side factors
dominate and the ability to assess the imitability of the complementary assets that underlie the
mobility constraints. Theoretically, firms can isolate human capital when the high constraint is
stronger than the low constraint – e.g., when high supply-side constraints dominate low demand-
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side constraints or vice versa. Further, firms can derive sustained competitive advantages if the
constraints are not imitable by rivals. Practically, however, the challenge of identifying sustained
competitive advantage in these cells is more difficult. This practical difficulty highlights one of
the primary paths forward for future research, discussed in more detail in the following sections.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A NEW STRATEGY RESEARCH AGENDA
This paper demonstrates the need to rethink the role of human capital in generating sustainable
competitive advantages. Many have emphasized that general human capital cannot be a source of
competitive advantage or that it poses special management challenges (Coff, 1997; Hatch & Dyer,
2004). However, we suggest that general and firm-specific human capital may face the same
management challenges in some contexts; thus, this commonly accepted emphasis on the
specificity of human capital is overly simplistic and too heavily based on theoretical assumptions
that are inconsistent with observations of actual labor markets.
Rethinking Human Capital As a Source of Competitive Advantage
A more realistic framework of labor markets that accounts for both supply- and demand-side
constraints can identify when firm-specific human capital may fail to support competitive
advantages and, conversely, when general human capital may support them. Drawing on such a
framework, we have identified critical boundary conditions on the notion that firm-specific human
capital will function effectively as an isolating mechanism. Most importantly, the literature draws
on demand-side logic that is binding only when (1) workers’ general skills are not valued so highly
at other firms that it compensates for firm-specific skills that may not be highly valued, (2) external
employers can observe firm-specific skills and offer lower wages to workers who have invested in
them, and (3) there are no supply-side factors that promote mobility, even if there is low external
demand for skills. Scholars invoking the firm-specific human capital logic may be well served by
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theoretically and empirically considering how these boundary conditions affect their research
settings. Indeed, these binding conditions are often violated in real labor markets, such that
workers with firm-specific human capital may be far more mobile and tradable than is typically
assumed. In such cases, in contrast to prior treatments in the literature, such skills are very unlikely
to effectively hold valuable human capital in place.
Furthermore, supply- and demand-side factors may constrain mobility even for workers with
general human capital. On the demand side, firms’ complementary resources that create
information asymmetries or utilize idiosyncratic portfolios of general skills may engender very
thin markets, even if the skills are not customized to a given firm. Of course, supply-side factors
apply to both general and firm-specific human capital, as idiosyncratic worker preferences for
firms’ heterogeneous resources may push them to stay with a given employer even if their skills
are worth more elsewhere. This also represents a key departure from the previous strategy
literature, which has, for the most part, dismissed general human capital as a source of advantage.
Accordingly, we have advanced knowledge of the micro-foundations of competitive advantage
by more carefully specifying conditions under which individuals with valuable human capital can
be effectively isolated and their human capital leveraged to realize advantages (Coff & Kryscynski,
2011; Felin & Hesterly, 2007; Foss, 2011; Ployhart, Weekley, & Baughman, 2006). Thus, a firm’s
ability to generate advantages from human capital depends not only on the specificity of worker
skills, but also on the firm’s ability to create and/or leverage both supply-side and demand-side
mobility constraints to better retain human capital at discounts relative to rivals. As has been
argued by others, when the firm is better able to retain talented human capital, that firm is better
positioned to utilize these individuals to create and leverage firm-level resources to enhance their
competitive capabilities (Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011; Ployhart et al., 2006).
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A New Research Agenda for Human Capital-Based Competitive Advantage Scholars
We focus on three opportunities to extend theory, based on the high-level framework presented
in the prior sections. First, developing a more systematic and complete typology of labor market
imperfections that affect demand- and/or supply-side mobility constraints will help researchers
develop theory that addresses the full range of factors that are necessary to understand when human
capital can be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Second, empirically testing the
conditions under which conventional logics fail may help refine and validate the boundary
conditions and propositions presented here. Third, examining the relative intensity of these labor
market imperfections on demand- and supply-side mobility constraints will help researchers
determine when human capital is most likely to facilitate competitive advantage in the
indeterminate cells of Figure 2 (i.e. Cells 3-6). This advance, when integrated with recent research
from strategic human resource management, may help scholars identify new channels through
which managers can leverage and/or overcome both demand- and supply-side mobility constraints
in their efforts to realize competitive advantages.
Broader focus on labor market imperfections. The first opportunity for new inquiry is in
theorizing and operationalizing a broader range of factors that may limit the mobility of human
capital – i.e., a broader set of labor market imperfections. Again, the extant strategy literature has
reflected an implicit assumption that failures in the market for firm-specific human capital hinder
mobility while workers with only general human capital remain highly mobile. Arguments
presented here have focused on the role of complementary assets and highlighted how these can
make firm-specificity a poor proxy for immobility given the important roles of supply- and
demand-side constraints. As such, the analysis suggests a shift should be made in the way strategic
human capital researchers approach theories of human capital-based competitive advantage.

28

Rather than relying only on the specificity of human capital, researchers should explore the full
range of factors that isolate human capital in a manner that allows some firms to enjoy sustained
advantages.
Peteraf (1993) provides a useful starting point by identifying several classes of ex post limits
to resource mobility. In line with our focus on complementary resources, she includes nontradability of resources, switching costs, the co-specialization of assets, and high transaction costs.
To these limits, it is important to understand how individual preferences (such as an attraction
toward social ties, geographies, organizational cultures, and other organizational institutions) limit
the movement of human capital across organizations. While the present arguments touch on these
factors, further research should expand this list and explore the theoretical implications of these
factors in greater depth rather than relying only on firm-specificity as a proxy for the interaction
of multiple factors that restrict employee mobility.
Empirically testing when extant logics fail.

While Propositions 1 and 2 articulate the

conditions under which firms are most and least likely to realize competitive advantages from
general and firm-specific human capital, respectively, empirical tests of these propositions would
help identify whether these exceptions are meaningful in practice or only in theory. Specifically,
scholars may undertake studies of human capital-based competitive advantage in industries that
rely primarily on general human capital, such as the legal, software, and medical practice
industries.

Such studies may demonstrate how variances in certain supply-side mobility

constraints affect retention of critical workers, labor productivities, and overall firm performance
relative to rivals. Likewise, scholars may focus on industries that rely heavily on firm-specific
human capital, such as bio- and nano-technology, to empirically explore whether supply-side
“push” factors drive workers to sacrifice the value of their firm-specific human capital by changing
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employers. While recent years have seen an increase in studies exploring the strategic implications
of workers’ mobility (Aime, Johnson, Ridge, & Hill, 2010; Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf
& Almeida, 2003; Shaw, Duffy, Johnson, & Lockhart, 2005), analyzing these results through the
lens of intertwined demand- and supply-side constraints would advance the field’s understanding
of the phenomena by illuminating the antecedents of mobility and demonstrating that strategic
decisions of workers and firms interact to determine mobility.
The logic in this paper also suggests the need to critically evaluate the growing body of
empirical work connecting firm-specific human capital and competitive advantage (e.g., Hatch &
Dyer, 2004; Ployhart et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2009). This empirical research may have limited
generalizability for three reasons. First, there are clear boundary conditions to extant theory
underlying firm-specific human capital as an isolating mechanism, and future research should
recognize and explore these boundary conditions. Industry- or firm-level analyses that explore the
contexts where the three boundary conditions hold would be valuable to future work that explores
the specificity of human capital. For example, work that details conditions under which general
human capital is likely to be undervalued or firm-specific human capital is likely to be overvalued
by the market would be an important base for future empirical work. Second, extant measures of
firm-specific human capital tend to conflate firm-specificity with external market value. Scholars
have used proxies such as worker tenure (e.g., Harris & Helfat, 1997), on-the-job training (e.g.,
Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Ployhart et al., 2011), or patent self-citations (Wang et al., 2009), but these
measures do not capture whether skills are actually applicable to other firms. If firm-specificity
and exchange value are not tightly coupled in some contexts, then these standard proxies for
workers’ limited mobility are problematic. For example, long tenure profiles within a firm may
suggest the firm is better able to retain workers independent of the specificity of the workers’ skills.
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We call for the field of strategy to emphasize measures that more directly capture supply- and
demand-side constraints, such as employee satisfaction, strength of employee networks, and value
of external job offers, while simultaneously refining measures that more directly capture the extent
to which worker skills are deployable in alternative contexts. Third, previous studies have
emphasized isolated workers’ skills instead of examining the entire portfolio of skills possessed
by workers. Because workers’ skills are inseparable, the worker is the appropriate level of analysis,
not an isolated skill. As such, future research that addresses the exchange value of workers’ full
portfolio of skills would be an important contribution.
Factors underlying the intensity of supply and demand-side constraints. Beyond expanding
the list of imperfections that may constrain worker mobility, there is also an opportunity to study
factors that influence the intensity of these imperfections. For example, research exploring the
strength of human resource (HR) systems (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004) suggests that strong HR
systems may increase the intensity of supply-side mobility constraints in firms. Understanding
what impacts the relative intensity of these constraints may shed light on the indeterminate cells
in Figure 2.

Specifically, if theory can identify the conditions under which demand-side

constraints will be high, then we may be better positioned to predict when these constraints will
dominate supply-side factors and, therefore, lead to sustained human capital-based competitive
advantages.
These ideas suggest a new venue for research on human capital management capabilities. A
richer understanding of the role of complementary assets on the interrelationship of supply- and
demand-side constraints in supporting competitive advantage offers a new foundation on which
strategic human resource management (SHRM) practices contribute to sustained competitive
advantages. For example, numerous studies link SHRM practices to firm performance (e.g.,
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Arthur, 1994; Macduffie, 1995; Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen, 2005), but few have
specifically associated these practices to capabilities to create, leverage, and/or overcome these
mobility constraints. Indeed, recent SHRM scholars have called for work to open the “black box”
connecting SHRM practices and firm performance (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Collins & Clark,
2003; Wright, Gardner, & Moynihan, 2003). One way to open that black box may be to explicitly
connect these practices to the creation of specific supply-side constraints and/or to show how these
practices may overcome supply-side constraints imposed by other firms.
Similarly, firms may be able to generate advantages through their strategic factor market
activities in markets for human capital (Barney & Wright, 1998). However, extant literature has
not systematically examined these demand-side factor market capabilities and how firms acquire
or build them. In this vein, how can firms identify and value general human capital that other firms
overlook? One possible answer is to hire workers from stigmatized firms, schools, or social
categories. Indeed, some firms, like Wachtell, do seem to actively engage in such hiring practices,
but this has not been well researched and documented as a source of competitive advantage. This
is a fruitful area of inquiry that connects strategy and strategic human resource management.
Analogously, there are supply-side strategies like recruiting people who have a strong interest
in the company due to its location or some other personal preference. Clearly firms take advantage
of such opportunities when they see them, but this has not been the subject of research in the
strategy literature. As a result, the extent to which firms are heterogeneous in their ability to exploit
such supply-side preferences is not entirely clear.
While it is likely that specific capabilities are linked to exploiting supply- and demand-side
opportunities in strategic factor markets, these have not been the subjects of strategy research.
Almost certainly, such capabilities will not correspond to formulaic approaches that are frequently
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adopted in the SHRM literature since these practices would tend to be widely adopted over time
and would no longer be a source of firm heterogeneity (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009).
In each of these cases, we stress the importance of human resource practices in supporting
sustained competitive advantage by constructing and overcoming demand- and supply-side
constraints. However, there is a need to look well beyond the traditional policies and best practices
adopted in human resource departments. Some of the most critical human resource decisions take
place in executive suites without the input of human resource professionals. Others take place at
the shop floor level but also do not involve human resource professionals. These practices may be
less systematic and may also be tied to specific individuals’ management styles. However, these
idiosyncrasies may also make them harder to imitate than more systematic and professional
policies that have been studied thus far in the received literature.
Managerial Implications
By extending the view of human capital as a source of competitive advantage to examine a
richer set of labor market imperfections, this research supports a variety of approaches that firms
can take to construct human capital-based competitive advantages, including compensation design,
employee selection, and job design. For example, managers can design packages that are cospecialized with employee and contextual idiosyncrasies such that they are unique and inimitable.
If such packages provide employees with utility that is equivalent to a rival’s offer, but at a lower
cost, managers can effectively create supply-side constraints. Indeed, these idiosyncratic
compensation packages may be costly to imitate, resulting in sustained advantages. Such lowcost, high-utility, firm-specific packages may include access to social networks, locations, or
perquisites like a work environment that rivals are unable/unwilling to imitate (e.g., a faith-based
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or “green” culture). This capability is particularly important in Cells 5 and 6 of Figure 2, where
there is high external demand for workers’ skill portfolios.
In conjunction with offering firm-specific compensation packages, managers can focus on
selecting employees that complement the firms’ idiosyncratic attributes. For example, by hiring
employees that share a common set of values, it becomes easier to sell these values to subsequent
employees. If Google wants to offer the ability to work alongside smart and creative programmers,
then selecting these employees is essential to being able to offer this benefit to future employees
(Coff & Kryscynski, 2011). Over time, this path-dependent component of building the capability
can make it hard for other firms to catch up (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
Managers can also limit the mobility of their employees by utilizing idiosyncratic portfolios of
human capital more efficiently than rivals. In this way, they can create a gap between the value of
the individual at their firm relative to other firms and thus retain the employee at an economic
discount. Firms may be able to create more value from employees by designing jobs that utilize
the full breadth of individuals’ idiosyncratic skills by matching them to differences in technologies,
markets, or complementary assets that rivals lack. Similarly, managers can design jobs that create
information asymmetries and causal ambiguity that constrain worker mobility. Consider, for
example, a hedge fund that uses a confidential algorithm to convert the research of a pool of stock
analysts into buy and sell orders. No single analyst is aware of how much value his or her research
creates; thus, rivals cannot easily poach key employees since their value is unclear. These examples
highlight the strategic value of human resource practices in the resource-based view of the firm
(Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001) and describe some of the channels through which human
resource managers can tailor jobs and benefits for an individual in order to increase supply-side
constraints and thus support competitive advantage.
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From the manager’s point of view, many of these approaches expose the firm to the risks
associated with a bilateral monopoly. If a manager invests in designing a customized job or
idiosyncratic benefits package to match a unique individual, then although the employee may not
be movable, she knows that she may be very costly to replace and thus can hold up the firm.
However, these concerns are more relevant for exploring who will appropriate rent from a
competitive advantage than value creation (Coff, 1999; Peteraf & Barney, 2003).
CONCLUSION
In sum, a lack of recognition of the boundary conditions of when firm-specific human capital
restricts mobility has led to an over-reliance on firm-specificity as an isolating mechanism and has
diverted the strategy literature from important lines of inquiry that would help illuminate the
sources and nature of human capital-based competitive advantages observed in actual firms. This
paper only scratches the surface of the many critical questions yet to be explored on the interactions
of supply- and demand-side constraints on employee mobility that can support human capitalbased advantages. Furthermore, these questions have practical significance for managers seeking
to generate and sustain competitive advantages. In many cases, these implications differ
substantially from prescriptions that may be drawn from the extant strategy literature. Indeed, we
hope to encourage bold new directions in both research and practice.
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FIGURE 1
Decoupling Exchange Value and Firm-Specificity of Worker Skill Portfolios*
DemandSide
Mobility
Constraint
s

Firm-Specificity
High Specificity
(low transferability)

Traditional firm-specific human
capital: worker skill portfolio is not
applicable elsewhere and the market
correctly values the portfolio.

Low Specificity
(high transferability)

Undervalued general human capital:
worker skill portfolio is applicable
elsewhere, but the market
underestimates the value of the
portfolio.

High
Constraint

Examples:

(low
exchange
value
constrains
worker
mobility)

• Research scientist with substantial
industry experience working for a
firm that is not well known in the
• Professor who invests in skills (like
market.
case writing) that are not valued at
other institutions.
• Experienced lawyer looking for a job
after stigmatized collapse of previous
law firm (Rider et al., 2011).

• Experienced research scientist
whose career focuses on a narrow
proprietary product line.

Examples:

• Worker with idiosyncratic portfolio
of general human capital.

Low
Constraint
(high
exchange
value
enhances
worker
mobility)

Overvalued firm-specific human
capital: worker skill portfolio is not
applicable elsewhere but the market
overestimates the portfolio’s value.

Traditional general human capital:
worker skill portfolio is valuable and
applicable elsewhere and the market
correctly values the portfolio.

Examples:

Examples:

• Business school dean who is highly • Experienced software developer who
successful at fund raising due to
worked alone on high-profile
non-transferrable (and nonprojects.
observable) skills.
• Experienced lawyer with established
• Star analyst whose performance is
record of litigation success.
driven by firm-specific factors
• Professor with a strong publication
rather than superior general skills
record in top tier journals.
(Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008).
• Business school dean who is highly
successful at fundraising due to
personality, charisma and
intelligence.

*The shaded cells identify contexts that have not been emphasized in the prior literature since it
has been assumed that markets value firm-specific and general human capital correctly.
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FIGURE 2
Human Capital-Based Competitive Advantage Framework*
Demand- SupplySide
Side
Mobility Mobility
Constraints Constraints

Firm-Specificity
High Specificity
(low transferability)
1. Likely HC-Based Advantage

Low Specificity
(high transferability)
2. Possible HC-Based Advantage

Conditions:
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• Skill portfolio is very firm• Skill portfolio is very general
specific
• Worker wants to stay at current
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current firm
• Market underestimates value of
Supply• Market correctly values the
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skills
Constraint
Result: Human capital may be
Result:
Human
capital
is
effectively isolated in focal firm
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effectively
isolated
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focal
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because (1) workers lack
Demandbecause
(1)
workers
lack
attractive outside options due to
Side
attractive
outside
options
due
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incorrect market pricing AND (2)
Constraint
correct market pricing AND (2)
workers prefer not to change
(low
workers prefer not to leave focal
firms.
exchange
firm.
value
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3. Uncertain HC-Based
4. Uncertain HC-Based
worker
Advantage
Advantage
mobility)
Conditions:
Conditions:
• Skill portfolio is very firm• Skill portfolio is very general
Low
specific
• Worker does not want to stay
Supply• Worker does not want to stay
• Market underestimates value of
Side
• Market correctly values the
skills
Constraint
skills
Result: Human capital is effectively
Result: Human capital is
isolated if the lack of outside
effectively isolated if the lack of
options due to incorrect market
outside options due to correct
pricing are overcome by worker
market pricing are overcome by
desires to leave.
worker desires to leave.
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Demand- SupplySide
Side
Mobility Mobility
Constraints Constraints

Firm-Specificity
High Specificity
(low transferability)
5. Uncertain HC-based
Advantage

Low Specificity
(high transferability)
6. Uncertain HC-based
Advantage

Conditions:
Conditions:
• Skill portfolio is very firm• Skill portfolio is very general
specific
• Worker wants to stay at current
High
•
Worker
wants
to
stay
at
firm
Supplycurrent
firm
•
Market correctly values the
Side
•
Market
overestimates
value
of
skills
Constraint
skills
Low
Result: Human capital is effectively
DemandResult: Human capital is
isolated if accurately priced high
Side
effectively
isolated
if
overpriced
demand for human capital is
Constraint
high demand for human capital
overcome by worker desires to
(high
is overcome by worker desires to stay.
exchange
stay.
value
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7. Unlikely HC-based Advantage 8. Unlikely HC-based Advantage
worker
mobility)
Conditions:
Conditions:
• Skill portfolio is very firm• Skill portfolio is very general
specific
• Worker does not want to stay
Low
•
Worker
does
not
want
to
stay
• Market correctly values the
Supply•
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value
of
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Side
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Constraint
Result: Human capital cannot be
Result: Human capital may not be
effectively isolated because
effectively isolated because
market correctly prices the
market overprices firm-specific
general human capital AND
human capital AND worker
worker wants to leave.
wants to leave.
*While none of the cells have been fully developed in the prior literature, the shaded cells
identify contexts where the departure from extant literature is particularly significant.
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